The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) Report Into the October 7 Hamas Terror Attacks in Southern Israel Made forDifficult Reading For Most Israelis The Conclusions in the Report, Released Last Week, Were Not Entirely New, But They Added Another Layer After a psychological couple of Weeks in which 30 Hostages Were Returned Alive But 8 More Came Home in Coffins.
And while the initial stage of the ceasefire and captive launch offer has actually concerned an end, the following stage stays vague. Fifty-Nine Kidnapped Soldiers and Civilian Hostages Remain in Gaza, 24 of whom are Believed to Be Alive.
After the Publication of the Report, Israel’s Mainstream Daily Yedioth Ahronoth Ran the Headline “The Blindness, The Failure, The Questions.” The heading in Israel Hayom, A Right-Wing Free Daily, what “A Debacle, Years in the Making,” Referring To One Of The Report’s Key Findings: That Israel’s Intelligence Community Vastly Underestimated Hamas For Man.
In 2007, The Islamist Militant Group Sezed Control ofGaza From The Palestinian Authority In action, Israel Further Tighttened Its Control Over the Air, Land and Sea Borders, Controlling the Movement of People and Goods in And Out of theEnclave Both Israel and Hamas Have Fought Several Wars in Recent Years.
IDF’s Failure ‘Left Deep Scars’
On October 7, 2023, Hamas-Led Militant Launched A Large-Scale Attack on Southern Israel, Killing 1,200 People and Taking Another 251 Hostage, According toIsraeli Figures The Attack Sparked a 15-Month remained in which greater than 48,000 Palestinians have Killed, According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, and Much of the Small Territory was Razed to the Ground.
For some, the Latest Comprehensive Report About the Work of the Different Branches of the Military Comes Too Late; For Others, there is little brand-new to report. For several Israeli’s, The Idf’s Failure toProtect Its Citizens Has Left Deep Scars In Recent Months, The Military Has Provided Residented of Several Kibbutzim Near Gaza with minute-by-minute Reports of Events in their areas.
“The importance of the Report is first and foremost for the survivors, the families of Soldiers and Civilians who were killed, the families of those who were kidnapped and the [southern] Communities, Those who have still not returned, “Said Ofer Shelah, Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (In SS) and a Former Knesset Member.
“I think that was imported to reestablish trust between those communities, The Israeli Public in General, and the Army, that the army faces the survivors, and they tell them what happened, and be frank about it,” shelah Told dw.
He Added, However, that several Questions Remain regarding Why Things Happened the Way They Did Within The Military and Its Various Branches, and in Relation to thePolitical Echelons This was Echoed by Tamir Hayman, Director at the Ins and Former Head of the Military Intelligence Directorates.
“In Every Military Inquiry, Three Questions Need To Be Answered: What Happened, Why It Happed, And How To Improve,” Hayman Told a Panel at Channel 12’sMeet The Press On Saturday “Thesis Inquiries Give Us a Lot of Information About What Happed, But there is still one questions – why it happened – that i have not found Answers to.”
Misconceptions About Hamas
The Inquiry Concluded That The Assessment of Hamas Over Many Years Had Not Been Challenged which there down no conversation of the Question “What if we’Re Wrong?”
Accord to Amos Harel, Writing in the Daily Ha’aretz, “The Intelligence Community, with the Idf and the Shin Bet Security Service in the Forefront, Didn’t Believe That Hamas was Capable of Mounting A Coordinated Attack of Thousands of Terrorists at more 100 Crossing Points, Who Woilds Successfully overcome the gaza division and take control of a large part of the territory for what the division was responsible. “
The Inquiry as a result slammed the reality that knowledge and politicians went with a plan of “conflict management” Towards Hamas and an Incorrect Assessment of Its Capabilities and Intentions.
“Gaza was presented as a ‘Secondary threat’ Compared to Hezbollah and Iran,” Wrote Yossi Yeshuoshua, Military Affairs Correespondent for theNewspaper Yedioth Ahronoth “The enttire Israeli Leadership – from the Government to the Intelligence Branches – Became Addicted to Intelligence Produced by Advanced and Sophisticated Technology, Creating Complacency and Arrogance Among Those Supposed to Be Constantly Looking Over Their Shoulters. Shouted ‘Cyber’ and Fell Asleep at the While Hamas was Preparing a Medieval-Style Invasion. “
On Attack Long in the Making
The Report Found that, Based on Documents Found in Gaza and Interrogations of Senior Hamas Militant Capture During the War, The Group Began Discussing A Large-Scale Attack After The 2014 was in between Israel and Hamas.
The strategy, which Later Became Known as “Jericho Wall,” Was Developed Primarily by Yahya Sinwar, Considered One Of The Leading Planner Of October 7, After He Became Head of Hamas in Gaza in 2017. IT Involved A Surprise Attack on The Idf’s Gaza Dived Around The Gaza Strip and the Taking ofHostages Accord to the examination, Hamas Considered Carrying Out the Attack Plan as Early as May 2021, when Israel and Hamas Fook was 11-day inGaza At the moment, Israeli Military Intelligence was uninformed of the strategy, the Report Stated.
The Report Shows that the May 2021 was, so Known in Israel as “Operation Guardian of the Walls,” What aTurning Point The IDF Publicly Concluded as Hamas Had Beet Deal a Severe Blow, with Large Parts of Its Tunnel System – Dubbed the “Metro” by the Army – Destroyed, which Underground Israel Had Built Had Reduced Infiltration to aMinimum Israeli Leaders Appeared to Believe That Hamas Wanted to Focus on Economic Development and Maintain Calm most of all.
But the Report Said that, in Fact, Hamas Felt Encouraged by the end result of the 2021 War due to the fact that it was Had Managed to Gain Support in the Region – Including by Fomening Unrest in “Mixed Cities” in Israel – Without the Idf Launching A Major Ground Operation.
The Report So Renewed Calls for A State Commission of Inquiry to Investigate The Role ofIsrael’s Political Leadership “The Israeli Public Can’ture That Politicians Pay a Price, and That’s why they want a commission of Inquiry,” Said Ofer Shelah.
An Opinion Poll Published on Friday Asked Responves Whether the Military Investigation was Enough, or Whether there ought to be a state or political payment ofInquiry ONLY 6% CLAIMED They Thown the Military Inquiry was Enough, While 58% Said They’d Like to See A State Commission ofInquiry
While Idf Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi Has Resigned Over The Failures Of October 7 and Will Leave his Post on Wednesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Has not Accepted Responsibility and Has Repeatedly Put Off A Full Investigation Until After The War.
Edited by Ben Knight
